Apologies for the slow reply @cap. These are really great questions thank you.
However many you could fit within the expected token budget, but yeah the trade off here is delegate workload. A big part of the thinking here is to locate all the delegate decision making time to periodic votes rather than continual engagement. The engagement and uptake on the votes would be a core KPI for the meta programme I think.
Yes
Intended, but not happening yet. What I am trying to drive at here is a values set that champions permissionlessness, because it’s just easier not to do it.
It’s doable, I’ve been thinking about the mechanics for this for years with FactoryDAO. We’re not far from theory to practice.
Maximally reducing friction is the goal. Getting bogged down in deep DAO politics is the last thing we want builders to be doing.
I think ideally we get to proactive funding and we have dynamic deliberative struture that flows assets towards the typologies of building we want the most at that time.
Great question and a big one. Projects, hackers, DAOs, ideally we attract mechanism heads from across the industry to get here and ship.
Mechanism design is certainly a highly technical art and science. I would love to see deep collabs between tech people and creators of all kinds.
As long as its radically open. Micro communities are an inevitability in this kind of coordination and in large organisations generally, but you don’t want to keep deliberative conversations to be shielded from the wider system. It’s already a bit of a problem that we have good conversation happening in a delegate TG channel that the wider voting populace can’t see.
Competition is the key IMO. This isn’t the world of HR and committees. It’s the world of cryptoeconomic games. Play to win.
Good question. At some point the subjective needs to become objective. Curation is the game. You can’t escape intersubjectivity and what I call “the appraisal problem”, meritiocratic evaluation mechanisms, and making the appraisers compete is the path away from managerial bottlenecks and coordination costs.
I think we’ve got one going right here. Again, more of the forum the better.
If you have someone ‘in charge’ of an ecoystem you’re doomed to failure. We’re looking for incentive games that drive adoption in the widest possible variety.
I think each TPP would have some kind of facilitating set of actors that would be incentivised to make the thing work. I personally think we should keep “leads” away from the global consensus layer.
I see this as a different paradigm, to the DAO funds a group to do departmental like work. If the mechanisms leads to the bootstrapping of independent DAOs, that have their own autonomous focus within the ecosystem that’s far better than clusters of centralised teams coming back to the DAO for funding periodically.
Consider the difference between a DAO with it’s own sustainable economic model, vs a company coming to the DAO for funding every 6 months or whatever. That’s what we’re looking for IMO. Islands of sustainable autonomy.
Love how you’ve described this here. A great way to frame it thank you.
Yeah obviously we’ve got a hard path to get to a more automated vision. It’s less of an end game and more of a beginning of a new era of DAOs IMO. There’s obviously a bootstrapping phase and as we’ve seen in the draft TPP for the ignite system I think it’s clear we’re going to need interim structures.
Whether it’s going to happen here or not, or in some other ecosystem is the question.
Personally, I think the more we go down the old model of giving centralised teams money the more likely that it’s not going to happen here. Practices entrench quickly and every person or group who doesn’t get the privilege of centralised power is more aggrieved than the last. I flagged these concerns in my response to first TPP draft. [Draft TPP] ZKsync Ignite Program (the "Ignite Program") - #54 by drnick
It’s an opportunity for this DAO to be different, and that closes down the more we don’t take it.